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ABSTRACT 
 
The Greens have grown in strength as an electoral force in the last decade. Some of the discussion 
about this has sought to comprehend the party and its support base as a ‘left bloc’ political 
formation. An understanding of the process of the formation of the party further illuminates this 
analysis. It also helps to explain the ‘dry years’ of the party in the 1990s. This paper will consider 
the history of the origins of the Greens and what that suggests about its course for success in 
winning broader support. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The main federal electoral successes of the Greens have come in the last decade. Its general election 
lower house vote grew to 4% in 2001, more than 7% in the middle of the decade and 11% in 2010. 
It began to win Senate seats in more than one state at a time and, more slowly, lower house seats, 
first one at a by-election in 2002, and then one in a general election in 2010. 
 
These successes have drawn some to attempt to understand the Greens and the party’s support base. 
Much of this effort considers evidence from the last decade. 
 
The earlier history of the party, however, and in particular its multifarious origins in the period of 
the Hawke and Keating governments, also illuminates the characteristics of the Greens and Greens 
supporters. In this period support for the ALP weakened, which made a new party of the Left 
possible. The Greens are the stand out result of the attempts to realise that possibility. Nonetheless,  
among those who took the name ‘Greens’ at that time, there were differences about what Green 
politics should involve. This was expressed primarily in a conflict about the sort of party structure 
and membership that Greens wanted. In the course of that conflict, a national Greens emerged, but 
because of how that happened, the existing momentum for a new party was temporarily exhausted. 
Little progress was made in improving the numbers of members, the overall vote, and the 
organisational reach of the Greens throughout the party’s ‘dry years’ (Amanda Lohrey is the source 
of this term, 2002, 40, but she uses it somewhat differently) of the 1990s, relative to the opportunity 
that had been available. What can be observed and understood about the difficulties the party 
experienced in the period of its formation might speak to how the synergies of the Greens and their 
support base apparently now being realised can progress. 
 
The Greens: An Environmentalist or a Broader Left Party?  
 
Amanda Lohrey’s 2002 essay on the rise of the Greens offered an important early analysis of the 
party and its support base. According to her, the Greens authentically represent a ‘progressive 
constituency’. This constituency consisted of a ‘core ecology vote’ and a ‘broad-based protest 
vote’.(64, 66-68) 
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Many have maintained that the Greens have an environmentalist origin and focus. (for example:  
Hawker 2009, 12, 16; Hoffman and Costar 2010, 702; Williams 2006, 325-28, 337) Moreover this 
has sometimes been tied to a view that socialist politics or ideological commitments would render 
the party ineffective or introduce conflict into it.(Hutton and Connors 2004, 36; Manning and 
Rootes 2005, 403-08) 
 
As the Greens’ vote has grown, however, the broader support for the party has been discussed. 
Some recent works suggest a different analysis of the Greens and the party’s support base. David 
Charnock found that Greens support had always depended on voters with ‘left’ attitudes. He 
concluded that the Greens ‘appear to have little practical alternative to working within the “left 
bloc” framework’ electorally.(2009, 246-56) Ashley Lavelle noted that a consequence of ‘the death 
of social democracy’ and left electoral challenges was that the Greens’ articulation of a clear 
alternative had resulted in the party’s policies being perceived as more social democratic than those 
of the ALP.(2008, 42, 171)  
 
Critiques of the Greens’ leftism argue that it is limited. One argument is that a relatively narrow  
support base for the party’s protest ‘against the political system in general’ will make its left stance 
difficult to sustain electorally.(Hawker 2009, 11-14) Others discuss factors that apparently 
contradict the leftism: support from among conservative small business people and middle class 
professionals (Bramble and Kuhn 2011, 189); or the party not accepting class as an organising 
concept for the party’s politics and strategically orienting to trade unions, as the ALP does.(Bramble 
and Kuhn 2011, 184; Tietze 2010, 27, 33-34) 
 
Events in the period of ALP government between 1983 and 1996, the time of the Greens’ orgins 
sheds light on these counter-arguments. 
 
First, at that time the ALP continued its pursuit of the ‘national interest’ and, thus, the management 
of Australian capitalism,(Bramble and Kuhn 2011, 6-11), hardly a Left perspective in any sense 
similar to that of the Greens.(Hawker notes the Greens socially-based concerns are 'internationalist': 
2009, 16) or organising politics from a class struggle perspective (at least, not that of an 
independent working class). Most unions played an important part in the government’s approach 
through the ACTU-ALP Accord: then, as always, the trade unions are not necessarily politically 
left-wing.  
 
Second, stronger identification with the ALP started dropping.(Goot 1999, 22) This movement was 
not, however, politically conservative. Instead, it gave impetus to attempts to form parties that were 
on the Left, including the Nuclear Disarmament Party (NDP) and the leftward turn of the 
Democrats partly associated with Janet Powell’s leadership.(Economou 1997, 262-64)  The Greens 
were part of that movement. 
 
Finally, the political science discussion at this time was about a possible broad party ‘dealignment’. 
Indeed, the new party movement started with a bang: in ten months from the NDP’s foundation in 
June 1984, the party won a vote of 7.2% nationally in the Senate and recruited 10,000 members, 
before its first and only conference in April 1985.(Direct Action, 1984-85) Also, as the Democrats 
moved to the left, the party’s vote peaked in 1990. The issue with regard to the Greens could be 
why did the party take a decade or more to reach these levels(on party membership, see Willingham 
2011)—and now how it might move beyond that. 
 
ANALYSIS 
 
Emergence of Green parties 
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The national Greens effectively had three points of origin (The Greens WA emerged through a 
separate process of amalgamations of organisations and groupings in that state: Green Issue: 
Newsletter of the Greens WA, 1989-90; River 1994, 12-15). The best known of these was among 
environmentalists in Tasmania. In 1972, they created the United Tasmania Group. In 1982, Bob 
Brown became the first parliamentarian from their ranks. Later in the 1980s, the parliamentarians 
began to call themselves Green Independents. 
 
As well, two green parties were started in 1984: in Brisbane, the Green Party, and in Sydney, the 
Greens. A leading figure in the Green Party was Drew Hutton. Over the next two years, he 
advocated for ‘a national party, that if it wasn’t in the mainstream, it at least had a possibility of 
being so, and having close connections with the conservation movement’. Not achieving success in 
that, in 1987 he took part in the formation of the Rainbow Alliance.(Hutton 1994) 
 
The initiative for the Sydney Greens came from inner-city libertarian socialists. This party 
registered the name ‘The Greens’ to get its lower house candidate identified as such on the ballot 
paper.(Harris 2010, 71-72). The Sydney Greens favoured creating Greens parties as local or 
regional alliances acting as auxiliaries for a community-based, direct action politics.(Harris 2007, 
203) 
 
From the late 1980s, starting with the lead-up to the March 1990 federal election, there was a 
chance to put the Sydney Greens’ perspective into action. The reaction against the experience of the 
ALP was deepening. Greens parties appeared to provide a difference from the major parties in their 
refusal, largely, to compromise on or tradeoff policies, (Burgmann 1993, 217-19; and as a Greens 
WA newsletter explained: cited in Jorquera 1996) and in which to be active.(Brewer 1991b). As 
well, many were inspired by the experience of the West German and other European Greens parties. 
The Greens registration was offered to any group which subscribed to the four basic principles of 
the German Greens: a sustainable economy, grassroots democracy, social and economic equality, 
and disarmament and non-violence .(Green Alliance 1989, 8; Harris 2007, 205-06) 
  
In NSW, the alliance approach was explicit. The September 1989 founding conference of the Green 
Alliance declared: 
We don’t want to form a traditional hierarchical party. The form appropriate for a Green 
party or organisation in NSW now is a growing alliance of local parties, groups and special 
interest organisations. (Green Alliance 1989, 8) 
All who were interested were invited to take part in the state-wide GA and to form or join a local 
Green group. Eventually six local Green parties were formed in Sydney and others founded on the 
Central Coast, in the Hunter and the Illawarra, and in the electorates of Cowper and Richmond in 
the state’s northeast. More than 400 in the GA Senate pre-selection.(Brewer 1994; Direct Action, 
1989-1990; Harris 2007, 206) In Victoria, SA and the ACT there were also Greens-registered 
Alliance parties. The SA Green Alliance was initiated in February 1990, when the Green Party (SA) 
decided not to stand..(Direct Action, 1989-90) 
 
This burst of Green party formation occurred despite the resistance it faced from many of the 
professional activists in the peak environmental organisations. They had closely aligned the 
environment movement nationally with the ALP in the 1987 election.(Doyle 1991) They claimed 
the new Green parties were fragmented, inexperienced and lacked electoral support, but also seem 
to have been unwilling to accept the objectives of the Greens—rejection of major parties as 
‘manifestly inadequate’ and a commitment to democracy in decision-making—and the range of 
groups and people involved.(Arnold 1989, 56; Burgmann 1993, 222; Direct Action, 1989; Green 
Alliance 1989, 8) The same organisations were influential in the decision of the Queensland Green 
Network not to stand a Senate ticket: the QGN endorsed two lower house green candidates.(Sibelle 
1994) 
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A National Greens Party is Proposed and Opposed 
 
After the 1990 election, the Hawke-Keating government introduced laws that provided ‘resource 
security’ for the forestry industry. The groups—TWS, in particular—become more open to backing 
a Greens party. 
 
In July 1990, Hutton met with Brown. Brown felt the Greens’ achievements in Tasmania, the 
unacceptability to Greens of the growing separation of rich and poor, and ALP inaction on land 
rights and the environment made ‘clear … that we should have a national Greens’.(Brown 1994; 
Hutton 1994) In the following months, they contacted and met with the Greens WA Senator, Jo 
Vallentine, leaders of the Democrats and the Rainbow Alliance, and leading peak environment 
group figures, to discuss the formation of a national Green party.(Green Left Weekly, 1991; Norman 
2004, p. 161) Hutton also was the Brisbane mayoral candidate in the Green Alliance campaign for 
council elections in southeast Queensland that developed out of QGN discussions and as various 
parties—the Democrats, the DSP, Rainbow Alliance, and also the Socialist Party of Australia—and 
independent activists eventually nominated 16 candidates for Brisbane and three other councils’ 
wards. Hutton. With supporters, up to three hundred people were involved. DSP member Maurice 
Sibelle, who was elected campaign coordinator, stated ‘a certain solidarity [developed] among the 
people who ran … It did reflect itself in the ease with which we worked together, despite the 
political differences’. The Green Alliance mayoral vote was eight per cent and ten of its ward votes 
exceeded 10 per cent, including one 26 per cent vote.(Eddy 1996, 298; Hutton 1994; Sibelle 1994) 
 
In April 1991, Brown told the Ecopolitics V conference: ‘The question now, to me, is not one of 
whether we're going to have a cohesive national green force, but when. And the sooner, the 
better.’(Nichols 1991) His green party would be a complementary electoral apparatus and reforming 
‘voice in parliament’ for community groups(Brown 1994) and would be organised  to compete with 
the established major parties, and the  media and ‘multinational organisations’, in order to ‘give the 
electorate the alternative’.(Painter 1991b) 
 
Brown’s proposal interpreted the Green principle of participatory democracy in a particular way. 
First, according to Brown, ‘trying to get the perfect organisation which doesn't allow any individual 
to be more or less than any other individual within that framework before we move on’ was a ‘big 
danger’: full, informed consensus on every matter was not possible. The Greens, he argued, should 
‘highlight trust in the people that represent us’.(Painter 1991b) 
 
Second, the Greens would be directed by broader populations over and above party members. Most 
important among those was the green movement, constituted as the spectrum of community groups. 
With that movement, a connection that was constituted by constant liaision, common work, 
representation and dialogue would provide a basis for developing party membership and policy. 
(Brown 1994; Green Left Weekly, 1992-1995; Stannard 1991) The movement would also hold 
parliamentarians to account, while the Greens membership, the movement’s ‘tip of the iceberg’,  
would choose another representative.(Brown 1994; Painter 1991b) 
 
Hutton has identified the opposition to Brown’s proposal as coming from three sources: the Greens 
WA, the ‘Green parties controlled by the DSP [Democratic Socialist Party]’, and the proponents of 
autonomous local Green parties.(Hutton 1994; also Lohrey 2002, 35) The proposal challenged the 
perspective of each of these three that Greens politics should pursue a restructuring of society. (see, 
for example, Harris 2007, 203) 
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Within the Greens WA were members who supported a radical politics. In 1992, Christabel 
Chamarette, who had recently replaced Vallentine as a Greens WA senator, was asked what sort of 
change the Greens sought. She replied: 
I was going to say revolutionary change, but I prefer the term ‘transformation’, because 
transformation implies using what we've got in a radically new way ... so what ordinary 
people are saying has more value than what parliamentarians are saying.(Noakes 1992) 
Thus, the Greens WA 1992 decision to remain independent of, but collaborate with, the national 
Greens was not the result of WA parochialism.(cf. Brown and Singer 1996, 85; Lohrey 2002, 35)  
The membership vote on joining the Australian Greens in fact supported participation in a national 
Greens in principle, but two-thirds backed the Greens WA remaining independent.(Green Issue: 
Newsletter of the Greens WA, 1992) This suggests that many Greens WA members felt uneasy 
about the national party that was being formed.  
 
The alternative proposal to Brown’s was for a loose network of autonomous Green parties. The 
DSP pushed that proposal as a provisional measure, in support of creating ‘a grassroots party of a 
radically different type’ rather than ‘another traditional parliamentary party’. The DSP also 
suggested that time should be taken to in order avoid domination of the process by any 
group.(Sibelle 1991) This meant, as Harris pointed out, that the DSP adopted a decentralist rhetoric 
while not supporting autonomous organisation in principle and itself working as a unified 
group.(Harris 2007, 203) Nonetheless, the DSP’s arguments were related to the transformative 
politics of ‘decentralism’. It opposed what appeared to be moves to claim exclusive control of the 
name ‘Greens’ and it proposed the subordination of the activity of elected Greens representatives to 
‘the democratic empowerment of members’.(n.a. 1991) 
 
Also, that some Greens parties the DSP was involved in opposed Brown’s proposal does not 
substantiate the claim that the DSP ‘controlled’ or ‘colonised’ (Harris 2007, 206) those Green 
parties. First, the evidence from this time does not support the claim: the DSP did seek to ensure 
that there were Greens election campaigns and that it was part of them,(Harris 2008, 9)  but not a 
controlling position in those such as the leading candidate in Senate tickets.(Direct Action, 1989-90) 
Second, the claim does not allow that other members of these Greens parties simply might have 
agreed with the DSP’s view. 
 
Opposition to the national Greens project also came from Greens who supported the autonomy of 
regional parties.(Brewer 1991b; Painter 1991a, 1991b) The libertarian socialists in Sydney, 
however, were frustrated by the divorce of grassroots activists from the debate about forming 
national structures, a new lull in Green politics, the failure to create the ‘anti-party party’ that had 
been wanted and the marginalisation of Green politics as a fundamental social-ecological critique. 
Now, according to Tony Harris, the national registered officer for the Greens, those who had taken 
the initiative in 1984 in Sydney, ‘had seen the realpolitik writing on the wall and were prepared, to a 
degree, to lower our expectations’.(Harris 2007, 200, 206-07) 
Founding the Greens Nationally 
 
After Bob Brown’s Ecopolitics V speech, the calling of an election in NSW pushed back the timing 
being considered for a meeting about the formation of a national Greens to August. Also Harris 
withdrew from the national discussions about the future of the Greens and, acting on his authority 
alone, handed over his position as the Greens registered officer to Steve Brigham, from the 
Illawarra Greens. By the middle of May, Brigham, Hall Greenland, who was another of the 
libertarian socialists in the Sydney Greens and had played a key role in bringing together GA, 
Brown, Hutton and Vallentine circulated a letter that proposed an August conference. (Green Left 
Weekly, 1991; Harris 2007, 200-01) 
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In June, proscription of members of other parties from the Greens became a prominent issue. 
Typically parties in Australia, most significantly the ALP, have proscribed members of parties that 
had contested elections against them. The Green parties in Tasmania and WA had already 
introduced a partial proscription that prevented members of other parties having full voting 
rights.(Green Issue: Newsletter of the Greens WA, 1990; Hall and Lapthorne 1989) Harris also 
seems to have had this issue in mind when he spoke at the Ecopolitics V conference: 
I think all the green perspectives belong within green politics…  
In the best of all possible worlds, tomorrow all the green parties, the Democrats, the New 
Left Party ... the Democratic Socialist Party ... could all disband our existing organisations 
and dissolve into a new organisation.(Painter 1991b) 
 
Supporters of the national Greens project now asserted that the broader alliances existing in the 
Green parties were not ‘the correct basis for a new political party’(Hegge 1991) and advocated 
proscription of members of all other parties . In Brisbane, Hutton and others called on the 
Queensland Green Network to support the national Greens proposal with proscription: the QGN 
agreed, but because the network was constituted with an open membership, the project’s supporters 
there established the Australian Greens Working Group (AGWG). In the Illawarra Greens, a 
meeting was convened to discuss on and vote for proscription without informing the DSP members 
who were involved.(Green Left Weekly, June-July 1991) 
 
In July, a GA meeting resolved that its delegation to the August conference would support a 
national organisation of autonomous parties and agree to some form of proscription of other parties 
‘either immediately or under a sunset clause’. Also, teleconferences largely comprised of the 
Greens parties and groups that had implemented a form of proscription agreed that proscription 
should be a precondition for attendance at the August conference. Other Green parties went to the 
conference on the basis that they had agreed to consider proscription after a national green party 
was established and operating for some time.(Brewer 1994; Brown 1994; Green Left Weekly, 1991; 
Hutton 1994)  
 
The teleconferences had decided on invitations, delegation sizes and agenda for the August 
conference. All Green parties were invited: from Queensland, the AGWG was invited, and also the 
Capricornia candidate that the QGN had supported, Craig Hardy, but not the QGN; from Tasmania, 
two of the Green electorate parties sent representatives. The delegation sizes emphasised the groups 
which had taken part in the conference organising process.(Green Left Weekly, 1991) 
 
Proscription was the first item on the conference agenda. It was quickly applied to the meeting 
itself: two delegates, who were DSP members, were compelled to leave. The North Shore delegate, 
Tony Jas, walked out in protest at what he thought was a small group trying to define what the 
Greens would be. The resolution on a ‘sunset clause’ was to enforce proscription of members of 
other parties in parties that would constitute the national Greens within six months. (Brewer 1991a, 
1991b) The conference then discussed the structure for the new party without attempting to make a 
decision about this. 
 
The discussion about the new party’s structure persisted for the next year, primarily in NSW. This 
fight, a ‘fundamental battle’ according to Brown, had confirmed for him his view that proscription 
of members of other political parties was necessary for the new Greens party. Eventually, as those 
who had supported autonomous organisation largely dropped out of the debate or shifted to 
supporting the national Greens project, an agreement on party structures was negotiated and the 
Australian Greens were founded.(Brewer 1994; Brown 1994; Green Left Weekly, 1991; Harris 
2007, 207)  
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The national party began with branches in only New South Wales, Queensland, and Tasmania. In 
Victoria in 1991, according to Hutton, there were ‘very few’ supporters of the prospective 
Australian Greens: the branch developed over the next two years, but could field candidates in only 
half of the state’s lower house seats in the 1996 federal election. The ACT branch was formed in 
1993, and the SA and NT branches formed in 1995. (Brown and Singer 1996, 84-85, 87; Hutton 
1994) 
 
In NSW, the Greens started to grow again in the lead-up to the 1995 state elections: Ian Cohen was 
elected to the upper house after the Greens vote increased to four per cent. However, the party also 
had a temporary rival, the No Aircraft Noise party, in inner-city Sydney. The role of the Greens WA 
senators with regard to the 1993 Budget and native title legislation, and the assistance offered by 
their offices to campaigns, helped give the Greens generally prominence and credibility among 
social movement activists. Nonetheless, a recovery in the mid-1990s of the Democrats vote in the 
state cost Chamarette her seat in 1996. In the same election, the Greens in Tasmania, with Brown as 
their lead candidate, won a Senate seat for the first time. (Green Left Weekly, 1993-1996) 
 
Authenticity, Democracy and Exclusivity: Consequences in Forming the Greens 
 
A decade after the formation of the national Greens, Lohrey argued that the Greens had ‘emerged as 
the authentic representatives of … the new progressive constituency’, being ‘an organic 
leadership’.(2002, 68-69) Her account had noted, however, the relative stagnation of the party in the 
1990s. This she explained by referring to ‘a change in the political mood’ in that decade. In this 
way, she glossed over the contribution that the party’s own decisions about made to that 
stagnation.(2002, 35-38) 
 
If the national Greens’ leading party members had had ‘authenticity’ in 1991 or 1992, that would 
have enabled the party to operate well without absolutely democratic structures. It would have 
given Greens’ members and supporters confidence in their parliamentarians and apparatus and, 
thus, would have partly substituted for democracy in the party. Then, to preserve that confidence, as 
Brown stated later, Greens’ parliamentarians needed to engage in a ‘real exercise of integrity … to 
be able to act for the members of the Greens, to be able to recognise that much wider electorate’. 
(Brown 1994) He might have felt that would be sufficient, given that in Tasmania, despite the 
tensions with supporters and communities that had emerged in 1989 after the Green Independents 
had won the parliamentary balance of power, the Greens had some success evolving more 
recognisable structures of power as they went.(Direct Action, 1989-90; Flanagan 1990, 129-30; 
Hopkins 1989, 8)  
 
In 1991 and 1992, however, the leadership of the national Greens had sufficient grounding in the 
social movements for authenticity only in Tasmania, and perhaps also in WA.(Eddy 1996, 302; 
Macdonald 1996) In much of the country—Victoria, SA, the ACT and western Sydney—the party 
initially had little or no formal existence. In most states, including NSW and Queensland, the 
Greens struggled to form effective branches or raise its vote to more than three per cent.. 
 
The votes for proscription at the August 1991 conference indicated this was the prospect for this 
national Greens proposal. These votes included 15 for, six against and six abstentions, with 3 anti-
proscription delegates excluded or absent, for the sunset clause—that is, just half of the conference. 
This was despite the favouring of the pro-proscription position in both the allocation of delegation 
sizes and the way the conference had been organised. If past campaigning and the potential for 
growth of the parties had been additional criteria for determining the delegation sizes,(as Marit 
Hegge, a supporter of the proposal, stated they were: 1991) then the delegations from Victoria and 
SA, where the  Greens parties had opposed proscription before the conference, and also WA  
probably should have gained delegates at the expense of the NSW parties and, especially, the pro-
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proscription AGWG. Also, a number of groups had pre-emptively introduced proscription, while 
others had suggested they would not attend the conference unless support for proscription from 
everyone else was a precondition for attendance. Finally, the conference agenda made proscription 
the first item for discussion, without other issues of strategy or structure for the Greens parties 
debated beforehand or together with this. 
 
Greens who wanted to form a national organisation which proscribed members of other parties 
claimed that was their right. Yet they also sought to exclude Greens who were members of other 
parties from the Greens as a political movement and challenged the registrations of Green parties 
that did not conform to proscription (deregistrations took a few years to be completed). In the 
meantime, the original Greens organisations in Victoria, South Australia, the ACT and western 
Sydney, where much of the initiative for their formation and maintenance had come from the DSP, 
were lost to a national Greens organisation. So were many of the Green parties’ members, both DSP 
and non-DSP, who opposed proscription and/or the more centralised structures proposed for the 
national Greens party.(Brewer 1991b; Eddy 1996, 310; Friel 1995; Hegge 1991; Macdonald 1996) 
 
The Greens’ more recent success might be seen to confirm the value of the national Greens project 
that Brown proposed. This presumes, however, that the Greens as the party has now developed was 
the party envisaged in the 1991 proposal for a national Greens. It has not been that party. 
 
First, the Australian Greens’ structure  was not what had been proposed. The balance between 
national and state organisations now favoured the state structures. Also, the party’s members gained 
the formal right to mandate the policies of the party’s parliamentarians.(Norman 2004, 163-64)  
 
Second, the Greens as a political party has not turned out to be, as Hutton proposed, peculiarly  
ecological and thus able to approach mainstream politics in connection with the large environment 
movement organisations. In fact, the Greens have never had a singular environmental focus: the 
Sydney Greens party was initiated by socialists, and Brown also long ago stressed the importance of 
social justice issues in his political activity.(Brown 1994) The Greens have been a left bloc party, 
undeniably ecologically informed, but also informed by the reaction against what the ALP in 
government was doing and the absorption of much of the ‘old’ left into that. 
 
In that context, the national Greens proposal threatened the nature of the party as an organisation for 
collective action through its practice and prospect of excluding activists from decision-making. 
Because its proponents did not have the established authority, democratic participation by Greens 
members in the national party’s formation was needed in order to resolve the differences among 
Greens activists without the party suffering substantial losses. For the activists, the kind of Greens 
party that would emerge was at stake. The experience of Greens parliamentarians’ integrity in 
responding to party policy and social movement perspectives did not provide for reciprocal 
relations within the networks of activists that would gain the confidence of many Greens activists. 
In this case, responsibility for the party could have substituted for not having confidence in it. 
 
Proscription reinforced the threat and worked against its solution. First, as Greens activists 
organised to press for their various views, it targeted the forms of that which had a history prior to 
the Greens. Also, when the activists belonged to organisations that would be proscribed but 
considered that their membership of these organisations fitted within the political framework of the 
Greens—as the members of the DSP did, for example, whereas those in Rainbow Alliance did 
not—they continued to feel responsibility for those organisations. Only successful experiences in 
the new party could have completed the replacement of past loyalties with loyalty to the new 
party.(Baker 1996) Excluding that possibility through proscription created rivalry for the national 
Greens, not so much electorally as for the adherence of activists and in the movement media. 
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Against the cost of proscription to the Greens, the party might have gained more from the measure. 
Proscription has been maintained in the Greens and has continued to be viewed favourably within 
the party.(see Norman 2004, 163) 
 
Hutton, for example, accepted that the DSP had decided ‘in the late 80s to … be green’ and also 
that its socialist ‘left humanism’ was ‘okay’ ideologically within the Greens. Yet he considered that 
because DSP members insisted on ‘maintaining their own organisation … inside the Green party’,  
that cemented the deep division’ between them and Greens with views like his and they ‘became 
ineligible to be involved in the Green party’.(Hutton 1994) Supporters of the national Greens 
proposal feared DSP members were not loyal to the Greens in the form of a successful national 
party.(Norman 2004, 162-63) 
 
From the DSP members’ point of view, they were committed to the Green Alliances and thought 
Brown and Hutton believed these were successful.(Sibelle 1994) They suspected the national 
Greens proposal was ‘a grab … for domination and control’.(n.a. 1991), especially once 
proscription was raised. The DSP and some other activists particularly objected to the suggestion 
that members of parties other than the Greens parties, in order to join the new nationally-organised 
party, would need to dissolve their existing parties first, without some experience of the new 
party.(Baker 1996; Green Left Weekly, 1991) 
 
The DSP responded to what it saw as a vitrolic campaign. In particular, it suggested Brown’s desire 
to move towards a merger with the Democrats was underpinned by an agenda for a similar, right-
wing, Green party. Yet the DSP included the same group of Democrats that Brown was talking with 
in its discussions about the left.(Brewer 1994; Green Left Weekly, 1991; Sibelle 1994) 
 
Nonetheless, Brown and Hutton held the initiative in proposing a national Greens party. Their 
proposal included a schema about the party’s relationship with the environment movement and 
mainstream politics that did not align the proposed party with key sources of support for the Greens. 
At the end of the 1980s, Greens parties formed across Australia with the involvement of a number 
of groupings interested in socially transformative politics, and again in more recent years the party 
has involved people from a range of political backgrounds and views, although not usually on an 
organised basis. Yet the national Greens proposal greatly restricted that expression of the successful 
Greens’ policy combination of ecological and social justice concerns without trade-offs between the 
goals involved in each. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The development of the Greens nationally, at the end of the 1980s, came as the ALP continued to 
lose support in reaction to its government. Unlike other new party projects of the 1980s, the Greens 
survived to become an effective political force. This can be largely attributed to the positing of the 
party as a potential replacement for the ALP (Brown and Singer 1996, 2) and the party acting on the 
main opportunities that were available to it, which were electoral and parliamentary activity. In 
these ways, the Greens laid the basis for a future break in the structure of party politics. 
 
First, however, the Greens had to overcome the consequences of the implementation of much of a 
proposal about how to form the national Greens that limited the scope for the party’s policy and its 
organising of collective action in the early 1990s. The various Green parties formed by the end of 
the 1980s had again brought together a relatively broad range of activists who were inspired to act. 
Then the plans for centralisation of the party and proscription within it provoked substantial 
opposition among Greens, primarily among those who approached Green politics from a social 
justice focus, whereas the proposal was underpinned by a focus on ecological politics. In the end, 
the views of that opposition were only partly accommodated in the new national party. Meanwhile, 
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many people, if not excluded from the Greens, were ‘whittled away’ through feeling that their 
experiences and campaigning networks were being ignored. They might otherwise have built 
Greens branches or autonomous parties.(Brewer 1994; Macdonald 1996) In turn, the opposition 
blocked thorough exploration of other opportunities to quickly broaden the party even further, such 
as among the left Democrats, and sometimes became rivals. 
 
Thus, the Greens failed to consolidate the critical mass of activists to maintain the electoral 
breakthrough that was first achieved in the 1980s, nor was the party generally successful in 
developing an organic relationship with the social movements. At this point the momentum for a 
new party took a backward step. Contrary to Robert Manne’s view that many Green supporters 
backed the ALP until 1996,(Manne 2010, 10-11) they were in fact already seeking a new party of 
the Left under Hawke and Keating, but in the 1990s mostly could not find one. 
 
Environmental and social justice activists drawing together political support has achieved 
increasing electoral success through the past three decades. A generally uncompromising adherence 
to policy and broader organisational approaches have provided the basis for uniting these elements 
of the ‘left bloc’. The Greens have advanced along this path. When they have deviated from it, they 
have faltered. Their likely road for success is to reinforce the party’s position of and in the Left. 
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